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TOO LOW A PRICE: WAIVER AND THE RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL 
Zachary L. Heiden* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Easy waiver of the right to counsel is at the heart of the problem with 
inadequate funding for criminal defense counsel for the indigent: without freely 
granted waiver of the right to counsel, the crisis in funding for indigent defense 
would, in the short term, be greatly magnified.  But, the ready acceptance of the 
waivability of the right to counsel devalues and diminishes the significance of the 
assistance of counsel in criminal matters. 
A.  The Current Scope of the Right to Counsel 
As it stands today, when the government accuses an individual of a crime, that 
person has the right to the assistance of counsel for their defense.1  If conviction 
carries the potential for the deprivation of life or liberty, or if the accused is a 
juvenile,2 then the government must bear the expense of representation if the 
accused also meets the eligibility requirements for indigence.3  For most others in 
the criminal system, the choice is between hired private counsel or self-
representation.4   
The right to counsel in criminal proceedings is guaranteed by the Sixth 
                                                                                                     
 * Legal Director, Maine Civil Liberties Union Foundation.  The views expressed here are the 
author’s own and may not be shared by the Maine Civil Liberties Union or the American Civil Liberties 
Union.  Then again, they may.  Thanks to Shenna Bellows, Kent Greenfield, Alisha Goldblatt, Gregory 
Heiden, Edward Reilly, Aviam Soifer, Corey Stoughton, and Ben Wizner for comments, suggestions, 
and encouragement.  Thanks also to the Maine Law Review for the invitation to participate in this 
symposium edition and for devoting an issue to such a significant matter of public concern. 
 1. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345-46 
(1963). 
 2. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (holding that the right to appointed counsel applies when 
proceedings may result in juvenile’s commitment to an institution). 
 3. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (holding that the right to appointed counsel 
applies whenever actual deprivation of liberty could be imposed); Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 
674 (2002) (holding that the right to appointed counsel applies even when sentence of incarceration is 
suspended and defendant is placed on probation). But see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) 
(holding that no right to appointed counsel applies when crime carries potential punishment of 
incarceration but prosecution agrees to only seek fine).  For a general overview of the right to counsel, 
see Marisa Van Dongen & Michelle B. Nadler, Right to Counsel, 86 GEO. L.J. 1593 (1998).  
 4. The right to counsel is generally regarded as a federal constitutional matter, though a number of 
states do provide greater protection under state common law, state statute, or state constitutions. All 
criminal defendants in Oregon have the right to appointed counsel, OR. CONST. art. I, § 11, as do all 
criminal defendants in Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-102 (2005).  The class of defendants 
entitled to appointed counsel in Massachusetts is also larger than current interpretations of the federal 
constitution requires.  MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 12; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 263, § 5 (2008).  See NAT’L 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL n.31 (2009), 
http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1239831988.5/Justice Denied_Right to Counsel Report.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2010).  
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Amendment, which states that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”5  The Supreme 
Court has recognized an absolute right to the assistance of counsel in cases that 
carry the threat of imprisonment and an absolute obligation on the government to 
provide counsel when a person cannot afford a lawyer.6  That right attaches when 
the adversarial proceeding begins, which, for many defendants, is when they are 
first brought to court, told of the charges against them, given an opportunity to 
enter a plea, and given an opportunity to negotiate bail.7   
It is very significant that the right to counsel attaches at the very beginning of 
the criminal process and not only when a defendant actually goes to trial.  Most 
criminal cases—as most readers of this paper no doubt know—do not go to trial.8  
They are resolved with a plea negotiation, and the opportunity for advocacy in that 
plea negotiation begins as soon as a person is aware of the charge against her.  For 
those who can afford their own lawyer, advocacy begins as soon as the lawyer is 
hired.  For those who must wait for the adversarial proceeding to formally begin, 
and for financial eligibility for court-appointed counsel to be sorted out, any further 
loss of advocacy opportunities only sinks the person deeper into the hole, having 
already potentially spent time in jail because of the lack of bail negotiations or 
having missed opportunities to begin speaking to witnesses.  It is no 
understatement to say that the recognition of the fundamental right to counsel in 
Gideon v. Wainwright9 was one of the most significant jurisprudential 
developments in our history; but it would be an overstatement to say that this 
recognition has succeeded in placing poor defendants on equal footing with those 
defendants able to hire counsel at the first sign of trouble. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that lawyers in criminal cases are 
necessities, not luxuries.10  Individuals handle their own criminal representation for 
one of two broad reasons: they cannot afford an attorney or they can afford an 
attorney but choose not to hire one.  But, as lawyers and non-lawyer television 
watchers well know, “if you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for 
you,” where “you” is a criminal defendant and “provided” means at the 
government’s expense.  Within the class of defendants who cannot afford an 
attorney, there are two further sub-classes worth delineating: those defendants who 
                                                                                                     
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 6. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (“From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and 
laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials 
before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot 
be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.”). 
 7. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). 
 8. A study by the United States Department of Justice based on charges filed in May 2004 in the 
seventy-five most populous counties in the United States found that, of the 57,497 felony cases filed, 
approximately 60 percent were convicted, with nearly 97 percent of the convictions resulting from a 
guilty plea.  Tracey Kyckelhahn & Thomas H. Cohen, State Court Processing Statistics: Felony 
Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2004, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, April 2008, at 
1, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc04.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2010). 
 9. 372 U.S. 335. 
 10. Id. at 344.  See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (holding that a defendant’s 
right to counsel was of paramount importance; that courts should strongly disfavor relinquishment of 
that right; and that waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel must be knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary).   
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are not eligible for court-appointed counsel because their offense does not carry the 
threat of incarceration (“indigent misdemeanants”) and those defendants who 
cannot as a matter of personal finance actually afford an attorney, but who are 
nonetheless not eligible for court-appointed counsel because they are not indigent 
enough (“insufficiently indigent”).11 
This Article discusses the interconnectedness of the plights of these three 
classes of defendants.  Allowing too many participants in the criminal justice 
system to proceed without counsel contributes to a public perception—and a 
perception on the part of the legislators who authorize funding for indigent legal 
services—that criminal defense lawyers are not a necessary component in a fair 
criminal trial.  This, in turn, means that legislatures are unwilling to adequately 
fund indigent defense systems, leading to a crisis in the courts that seals the fate of 
future indigent defendants.  The acceptance of easy waivers today means that there 
will never be money tomorrow to provide court-appointed counsel to defendants 
facing only fines—plus  collateral consequences—or to expand the definition of 
indigence to take account of the high cost of private defense. 
B.  The Undervalued Lawyer 
It is beyond question that the indigent defense systems in this country are 
broken, and many states are in the process of considering mechanisms for 
addressing the shortcomings.12  Some states have come to this realization on their 
own,13 while others have had their hands forced by class-action law reform cases 
addressed at inadequate fulfillment of Gideon’s promise.14  Proposed solutions 
                                                                                                     
  11.In Virginia, a single person must make less than $13,538 per year to be eligible for court-
appointed counsel.  State of Virginia Eligibility for Court-Appointed Counsel (July 1, 2009), 
http://www.courts.state.va.us/courtadmin/aoc/djs/resources/indigency_guidelines.pdf (last visited Mar. 
25, 2010).  In Maine, a single person must make less than $11,963, while a family of four must not have 
a combined gross income of more than $24,188.  State of Maine Guidelines for Determination of 
Financial Eligibility for Court-Appointed Counsel and Reimbursement for Court-Appointed Counsel, 
Admin. Order JB-05-6 (Aug. 1, 2005), http://www.courts.state.me.us/court_info/opinions/ 
adminorders/JB-05-6 Fin Eligibility.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).   
 12. See generally NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., supra note 4; Representation of Indigent 
Defendants in Criminal Cases: A Constitutional Crisis in Michigan and Other States?: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
(2009), http://judiciary.house.gov/hearing/printers/111th/111-20_48233.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2010); 
Ronald W. Schneider, Jr., Comment, A Measure of Our Justice System: A Look at Maine’s Indigent 
Criminal Defense Delivery System, 48 ME. L. REV. 335 (1996). 
 13. In 2008, a group of judges, legislators, executive branch officials, and other stakeholders in 
Maine came together to produce a report on deficiencies in Maine’s indigent legal services system, 
along with strategies for improvement.  This lead to the drafting of legislation, An Act to Establish the 
Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services, which was signed into law in June 2009.  L.D. 1132, 
124th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2009) (enacted), http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/bills_124th/ 
billpdfs/SP042301.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).  The Act created and funded a five-person 
commission, with the authority to oversee the provision of legal representation in criminal and child-
protective proceedings in Maine.  L.D. 1132 at 2. 
 14. A.M. v. Martin, No. 1:96-cv-02316-JEC (N. D. Ga. judgment entered Sept. 2, 1998); Hurrell-
Harring v. New York, 883 N.Y.S.2d 349 (2009); Plaintiffs’ Original Class Action Petition, Heckman v. 
Williamson County, No. 06-453-C277 (D. Tex. June 12, 2006); White v. Martz, No. CDV-2002-133, 
2006 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 136 (D. Mont. Jan. 25, 2006); Third Amended Class Action Complaint at 14-
34, Doyle v. Allegheny County Salary Bd., No. DG-96-13606 (Pa. D. & C.5th Nov. 21, 1997).  All were 
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abound.  One scholar has observed that further limiting the right to counsel for 
indigent misdemeanants to also exclude those only facing minimal jail time would 
free up scarce resources for felony representation, where counsel might make more 
of a difference.15  In part, she blames the problem of excessive caseloads on the 
expansion of the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases.16  “Lacking sufficient 
funds to hire additional attorneys to handle the influx of new cases,” she observes, 
“decision makers at every level of government have simply piled additional cases 
on top of the existing caseloads of indigent defense attorneys.”17  Her solution—
reduce the caseload of defense counsel by restricting the right to counsel—sounds 
eminently practical, but I would like to argue that it is precisely backwards.   
Instead, the way to ensure improvement in the indigent defense system is to 
make decision-makers reevaluate the importance of defense counsel.  If legislators 
believe that defense counsel is a critical component to the criminal justice system, 
and that the criminal justice system itself is important, they will fund it accordingly 
and appropriately.  However, legislators will never believe that defense counsel is 
necessary if millions of defendants each year continue to act as their own lawyers.  
Rather than restricting the access to defense counsel, the solution to our indigent 
defense system problems rests with further restricting the waiver of the right to 
counsel. 
II.  THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT LEGAL DEFENSE 
A.  Guilty or Not 
Visit the local trial court when arraignments are taking place and what greets 
you is a parade of people looking for the fastest way to conclude their business at 
the court that day.18  Tell them, or even just suggest to them, that waiving the right 
to counsel and entering a plea of guilty will allow them to make a short stop at the 
fine window before going home, and evidence suggests that this is exactly what 
many of them will choose, whether they understand the nature of the offense with 
which they are being charged, the scope of the right to counsel, the availability of 
legal defenses, or the collateral consequences of a guilty plea. 
To visit a court house on arraignment day is to be confronted with a disturbing 
spectacle of justice as applied.  The courtroom is mostly full of young people 
(some with parents by their side), adults on their way to work, individuals speaking 
                                                                                                     
law-reform class-action cases brought to address deficiencies in the availability and adequacy of counsel 
in for indigent criminal defendants. 
 15. Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461 
(2007). 
 16. Id. at 465. 
 17. Id. 
 18. My personal observations are drawn from my experiences observing courts in Maine, where I 
practice, but the experiences of other lawyers throughout the country suggest that these observances are 
the norm.  For a particularly insightful discussion of the chasm between the right to counsel and the 
reality for many defendants, see Andrew Horowitz, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: The Law 
and the Reality in Rhode Island District Court, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 409 (2004). 
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many different languages, and more than a few speaking to themselves.19  Some of 
the people are in shackles and orange jumpsuits, having been brought to the 
courthouse directly from jail.  Some people—very few—have brought lawyers with 
them.   For most people able to afford a lawyer, the lawyer takes care of many of 
the details usually associated with an initial appearance by mail or phone.  There 
may be a lawyer in the back of the room or in the hallway—a “lawyer of the day” 
—attempting to provide emergency advice, but the advice is necessarily boilerplate 
and barely resembles the considered, researched, individualized assessment that is 
usually what people mean when they say “legal advice.”   
When I have attended arraignment day as an observer, I have found myself 
barraged with questions—questions that, despite my legal training, my courtroom 
experience, and my expertise in some areas of constitutional criminal procedure, I 
felt woefully incapable of answering.  Without knowing the specifics of a person’s 
alleged offense, seeing the prosecution’s evidence, researching the available 
defenses, and calculating the consequences of various convictions, how could I 
possibly provide advice in such a situation?  What would the law professors and 
judges and lawyers who oversaw my training think of me if I were to offer off-the-
cuff guidance masquerading as legal advice?  But at the same time, though I was at 
a loss as to what the proper course of action was for the dozens of defendants 
present that day, I was still, objectively, one of the most well informed people in 
the room.  I am a law school graduate, a member in good standing of the state and 
federal bar, a former law clerk who has reviewed many criminal cases, and a 
practicing lawyer.  Though I do not usually practice criminal law, I have written, 
spoken, and lobbied on topics in criminal law and constitutional criminal 
procedure, including the definition of crimes, lengths and types of sentences, police 
conduct, personal privacy and government investigation, and the right to counsel.  
Though I did not know enough to provide what I would regard with confidence as 
sound legal advice, I certainly knew more than most of the people in the courtroom 
making their initial (and in many case, final) appearance before the judge.  If I did 
not know enough to say with confidence what the right course of action was, then 
surely these defendants did not either. 
And what these defendants were being called upon to say had substantial 
consequences for their future well-being.  As two scholars have argued, “The most 
important service that criminal defense lawyers perform for their clients is not 
dramatic cross-examination of prosecution witnesses or persuasive closing 
arguments to the jury; it is advising clients whether to plead guilty and on what 
terms.”20  Justice Thomas noted, in Godinez v. Moran, that the act of pleading 
guilty involves a number of critical decisions, including whether to waive the 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination; whether to waive the right to trial 
                                                                                                     
 19. Mental health and self-representation is a pressing problem and a rich topic for research. For 
one perceptive take on the issue, see Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 
UCLA L. REV. 921 (1985).  See also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (holding that the 
competency standard for waiving the right to counsel is the same as the competency standard for 
standing trial).  Individuals with mental illness subject to involuntary commitment proceedings are 
entitled to court-appointed counsel.  Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 497 (1979).   
 20. Gabriel J. Chin & Richard Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of 
Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 698 (2002). 
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by jury; and whether to waive the right to confront accusers.21  Individuals without 
counsel must make this critical decision without the aid of informed educated 
advice.  By allowing individuals to make these decisions, it devalues the perception 
of the role that lawyers play in providing such counsel. 
B.  Netflix Justice 
Arraignment, or initial appearance, in a criminal matter can mean many 
different things, and the practices vary from courtroom to courtroom, even within 
the same justice system in the same state.  But, typically, the assembled group is 
read a speech explaining the operation of the courtroom, the order of events that 
will occur, and the right of everyone accused of a crime to be assisted by an 
attorney.  Often, in particularly busy courts, the speech is presented by video—
”Netflix Justice”—and even if a person is paying attention, and is capable of 
absorbing complex concepts of constitutional criminal defense via video, there is 
no guarantee that that person will have an unencumbered view of the screen or an 
adequate opportunity to hear the audio portion.22   
The clerk then begins calling out names.  As a name is called, a person comes 
forward and is formally notified of the criminal charge with which he is being 
accused.  Depending on the court and the offense, the prosecutor may inform the 
individual (and the court) whether there is a possibility of jail time for that offense; 
if so, or if the person is a juvenile, he may be entitled to a free attorney.  In 1963, 
the Supreme Court recognized this obligation in Gideon v. Wainwright, where the 
Court noted that “any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, 
cannot be assured a fair trial” without counsel.23 
For most people brought into the criminal justice system, this is as far as it 
gets.  The prosecutor informs the judge that no jail time is being sought; the 
defendant tells the judge that she would like to plead guilty; and the judge asks her 
whether she understand the consequences of a guilty plea.  I would like to stipulate 
that it is not possible that most of these defendants actually understand the 
consequences of their guilty plea, but they almost always claim that they do and the 
judge then accepts their plea.  The individual now has a criminal record, and she 
typically then leaves the courtroom to find the window where she can pay the fine.  
C.  Collateral Consequences 
Beyond the fine and the hassle of having to show up in court, listen to a video, 
and then talk to a judge, some of the consequences of that guilty plea include: being 
asked whether he or she has a criminal record when applying for employment, 
housing, or bank loans.  Individuals can be denied jobs, housing,24 and credit based 
                                                                                                     
 21. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 398-99 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969)). 
 22. For a discussion of a number of the problems of arraignment day, including the seemingly 
ubiquitous arraignment video, see Andrew Horowitz, supra note 18.  Horowitz’s observations support 
many of the generalities that I have noted. 
 23. 372 U.S. 335, 344. 
 24. For more on the lack of housing options for individuals with criminal records, even records for 
shoplifting charges and not paying for video rentals, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO SECOND CHANCE: 
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on their criminal record, with no legal recourse.  If an individual is not a citizen, he 
or she can also be deported as a consequence of a conviction for a number of 
different crimes. 
Approximately 5.3 million American citizens have lost the right to vote 
because of a criminal conviction.25  Most states only disenfranchise felons, but as a 
result of widespread confusion about the law, possibly hundreds of thousands of 
eligible voters with misdemeanor convictions are denied the right to vote.26  The 
defendant hurriedly pleading guilty to a misdemeanor shoplifting offense is 
probably unaware at that moment whether that plea will, as a matter of law, 
temporarily or permanently jeopardize his ability to exercise his fundamental right 
to vote in the future, or whether officials in his state are adequately informed about 
the law to make sure he is not mistakenly purged from the voter rolls. 
Finally, every state in the country maintains a registry for sex-related 
offenses.27  Just as every state defines what constitutes a crime within its borders, 
each state also defines which offenses trigger sex-offender registration 
requirements.  Typical requirements include notifying the police of any change in 
address or employment; appearing at the police station for regular fingerprinting 
and photographing; not living in certain neighborhoods; not visiting certain areas; 
not coming in contact with children; and not holding certain professions.  The 
requirements shift from year to year, as does the definition of a registrant, and, as 
far as the federal courts are concerned, these shifts do not trigger a right to notice 
and a hearing.28 
III.  UNKNOWING, UNINTELLIGENT, INVOLUNTARY: FARETTA’S LEGACY 
Understanding the “collateral consequences”29 of a guilty plea, though, is 
                                                                                                     
PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS DENIED ACCESS TO PUBLIC HOUSING 54 (2004), 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/usa1104/usa1104.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2010). 
 25. ERIKA WOOD & RACHEL BLOOM, DE FACTO DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A REPORT OF THE 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION AND THE BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 1, 
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/racialjustice/defactodisenfranchisement_report.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 
2010). 
 26. Id. at 1-2. 
 27. See 42 U.S.C. §14071 (2009) (requiring each state to establish a sex-offender registry meeting 
certain federal requirements). 
 28. See, e.g., Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7 (2003) (“We find it unnecessary to 
reach this question, however, because even assuming, arguendo, that respondent has been deprived of a 
liberty interest, due process does not entitle him to a hearing to establish a fact that is not material under 
the Connecticut statute.”); Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 708-11 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding no due process 
violation on residency and travel restrictions for Iowa sex-offender registrants). 
 29. In this context, “collateral consequences” is the term generally used to refer to the negative 
consequences of a guilty plea or criminal condition beyond the sentence or fine imposed by the court, 
though this delineation has the unfortunate effect of subordinating penalties that may have severe lasting 
impacts on an individual—such as loss of the ability to vote; hindrance of the ability to get a job, an 
apartment, an education, or a loan; forced deportation; or imposition of lifetime criminal registry 
requirements—to penalties that may be resolved in a few hours or days.  Curiously, while it has long 
been clear that failing to advise a client of the criminal penalties attendant upon a certain course of 
action can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel,  only recently have courts begun to recognize an 
obligation on the part of defense counsel to advise clients of all the other negative consequences not 
encapsulated in the criminal code.  Compare Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327, 333-34 
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obviously only relevant for those individuals inclined to plead guilty—the stakes 
are even higher for those people who did not actually do anything wrong.  For 
those individuals mistakenly accused of a crime, or accused of a crime for which 
there exists an adequate legal defense, the challenges are greatly magnified.30  
Criminal defense is a specialized profession, and people who understand how to do 
it can make a good living at it.  Once in a great while, someone without any 
education or training does a capable job of representing himself or herself in court.  
But, like the piano prodigy who begins composing without ever taking a lesson, 
these individuals are not the norm.  For over seventy-five years, lawyers and judges 
have quoted (probably with some self-regard) Justice Sutherland’s opinion from 
Powell v. Alabama, as the last word on this subject:  
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not 
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.  Even the intelligent and educated 
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.  If charged with 
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the 
indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without 
the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted 
upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise 
inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his 
defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of 
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not 
guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to 
establish his innocence.31 
What if it was done differently?  Imagine instead if courts took seriously the 
notion of strongly disfavoring waiver of fundamental rights and refused to take the 
plea of someone who had not spoken with an attorney familiar with the defendant’s 
particular alleged offense as well as criminal law generally.  That person could not 
only help the defendant evaluate whether the prosecution would be able to meet its 
burden of proving each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
whether there might be a lesser offense that a person might bargain for, but they 
could also explain in greater detail the consequences of pleading guilty to a crime. 
The short, simple answer for why our justice system is not organized in this 
way—money—only serves to raise more concerns: there is always public money 
for some things and not for others, and what programs receive funding is not 
arbitrary.32  Defense counsel for people accused of crimes is required by the U.S. 
                                                                                                     
(2008) (finding no ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to accurately advise 
defendant of possibility of deportation following a guilty plea) with United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 
1005, 1015-16 (2005) (holding that counsel provided ineffective assistance when he misled his client 
about the immigration consequences of a conviction). 
 30. Defendants must understand the direct consequences of a guilty plea for it to be valid, Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969), but it is not a due process violation for an individual to plead 
guilty simply for the purpose of avoiding the death penalty, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 
(1970). 
 31. Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69.  Westlaw shows 11,421 citing references for Powell. 
 32. The political science literature on this general topic is well developed, and it is beyond the scope 
of this paper to represent it here.  For two specific insightful analyses, see Barbara Norrander & Clyde 
Wilcox, Public Opinion and Policymaking in the States: The Case of Post-Roe Abortion Policy, 27 
POL’Y STUD. J. 707 (1999) and Gregory B. Lewis & Michael Rushton, Understanding State 
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Constitution, while most government programs that receive their fair share of 
funding are not.  That should, in theory, make a difference.  It does not.33 
The situation I have described is most acute for the insufficiently indigent and 
the indigent misdemeant, who are unable to rely on the guidance of counsel for 
plea decisions and bail negotiations.  But there is also an unfortunate dimension to 
the cases of those defendants who are eligible for court-appointed counsel, or who 
are able to afford counsel, but nonetheless find themselves in the position of 
making these critical decisions without counsel.  In Faretta v. California, the 
Supreme Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel also includes 
a right to self-representation.34  Faretta involved a man accused of grand theft who 
requested that he be allowed to handle his own defense at trial.35  The defendant 
was warned by the court that it would be a mistake, but if that was the defendant’s 
wish, he would be allowed to defend himself.36  Then, the court changed its mind, 
and forced an attorney on the defendant, requiring that the entire defense be 
conducted by the court-appointed attorney.37  The jury found the defendant guilty, 
and the defendant appealed.38  After affirmance in the appellate court and denial of 
the appeal by the Supreme Court of California, the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and held that, because “[Mr.] Faretta was literate, competent, and 
understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed free will,” it 
was not appropriate for the trial court to force counsel on him.39  Faretta ought to 
be regarded as a retreat from the understanding of the role of criminal defense 
counsel in the criminal process put in place under Gideon.  While in Gideon (and 
Shelton) the Court placed enormous weight on both the complexities of the 
criminal justice process and the training of counsel in the science of law, Faretta 
demotes the defense attorney to a clerk, observing of the Sixth Amendment: “It 
speaks of the ‘assistance’ of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an 
assistant.”40  Too easily, Faretta couches the waiver of the right to counsel in terms 
of the right of the individual to make decisions about his or her own fate.41  So long 
                                                                                                     
Government Appropriations for the Arts: 1976-1999 (Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, 
Working Paper No. 07-02, 2007). 
 33. In evaluating the relationship between the state budget crises and funding for indigent defense 
services, the National Right to Counsel Committee cited an insightful column from Greg Kesich of the 
Portland Press Herald: “[T]his issue is not going to get the attention it deserves from the Legislature 
because it has come up at a time when budgets are being cut, not increased. . . .  And there is no political 
muscle behind indigent defense. . . .  But the difference is, none of those programs is required by the 
U.S. Constitution. According to the Supreme Court, indigent defense is, so failing to meet that 
responsibility is against the law.”  NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., supra note 4, at 183 (quoting 
Greg Kesich, Criminal Defense Costs Could Be the State’s Next Crisis, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Dec. 
17, 2008, at A10). 
 34. 422 U.S. 806, 832 (1975). 
 35. Id. at 807. 
 36. Id. at 807-08. 
 37. Id. at 810. 
 38. Id. at 811. 
 39. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835-36. 
 40. Id. at 820. 
 41. See United States v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999) (Frankfurter, J. concurring) 
(discussing ways that autonomy concerns are outweighed by due process right to fair trial); compare 
Robert E. Toone, The Incoherence of Defendant Autonomy, 83 N. C. L. REV. 621 (2005) (exploring the 
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as waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, it would be the height of 
paternalism to tell someone the best way to defend herself, or whether she ought to 
even bother defending herself. 
That would be bad enough, but most “waiver” cases are not Faretta—after-
the-fact challenges to the denial of the right to self-representation.  In Martinez v. 
Court of Appeal of California, in the course of rejecting the notion of a right to 
self-representation on direct appeal, the Supreme Court observed that the “right” to 
self-representation was less likely to be used as a shield for wrongly convicted 
defendants than as a sword in the hands of prosecutors to argue that an 
unrepresented defendant had waived the right to counsel and should be held 
responsible for his missteps and mistakes.42  Instead of protecting defendants, 
Faretta protects judges from reversal, so long as they are able to make a record that 
a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily relinquished the right to 
counsel and exercised the right to go it alone. 
The fiction that waivers are always, or even usually, or even occasionally, 
knowing and intelligent is easily pierced.  In the case United States v. Cronic, the 
Supreme Court explained that the right to counsel in criminal matters is the right to 
a fair fight in the adversarial criminal process; criminal counsel for the poor need 
the training, the skill, and the resources to meaningfully test the prosecution’s 
case—“the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.”43  In essence, Cronic stands 
for the premise that, evidence aside, both sides in a criminal matter start out on 
roughly equal footing.  We can try to imagine, as a thought experiment, whether 
there is any setting when the State might waive its right to the assistance of 
counsel.  If proceeding to trial without the assistance of counsel is an action that 
might knowingly and intelligently be undertaken, shouldn’t we be able to imagine 
when the government simply decides that the evidence in the case speaks for itself 
and that its prosecutors could busy themselves with other tasks?  Unless you are 
more imaginative than I, it is impossible to envision such a scenario.44 
                                                                                                     
challenges facing the pro se defendant as well as the effect pro se representation has on the justice 
system as a whole), with Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical 
Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N. C. L. REV. 423, 460-70 (2007) (discussing the legitimacy of 
the right to self-representation in terms of personal agency, with particular attention to the defendant’s 
interest in self-preservation). 
 42. 528 U.S. 152, 157 n.4 (2000). 
 43. 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984). 
 44. Or, as Justice Black put it in his majority opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright: 
Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to 
establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are 
everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly society. 
Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the 
best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses. That government hires 
lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the 
strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are 
necessities, not luxuries. 
372 U.S. at 344. 
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IV.  THE COST AND VALUE OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE COUNSEL 
A.  Resource Crisis in the Courts 
Providing counsel to poor defendants is expensive.  As Chief Justice of the 
State of Maine Leigh Saufley recounted in her State of the Judiciary address in 
2008, Maine spent $12.8 million on constitutionally required counsel and $45 
million on all other judiciary expenses including salaries, facilities, and materials.45  
And though, according to Chief Justice Saufley, “[t]hose attorneys receive 
payments far below ordinary professional charges,” providing counsel for those 
unable to afford counsel in Maine is a rapidly rising budget item.46  For the 73,039 
criminal charges filed in the State of Maine in 2007, the state paid for attorneys for 
16,950 people, at an average of $254 per case in the state’s district court, which 
handles misdemeanors and non-jury trials, and $490 per case in the state’s superior 
court, which handles felonies and jury trials.47  Though the Maine Legislature 
budgeted $12.1 million for indigent legal services in 2007, the actual expenditures 
were expected to rise to $13.6 million for 2008, an increase of more than 11 
percent.48 
Add a few zeros to these dollar figures, and you can get a good estimate of the 
analogous situation in New York.  In 2004, Judith Kaye, then-Chief Judge of the 
State of New York, convened a commission to study the effectiveness of the state’s 
indigent criminal defense system.49  The Kaye Commission found that “New 
York’s indigent defense system is in a serious state of crisis and suffers from an 
acute and chronic lack of funding,” which has had a “deleterious impact on all 
aspects of indigent defense representation.”50  Specifically, the Kaye Commission 
found that a lack of adequate funding lead to excessive caseloads; lack of full-time 
public defenders; lack of access to investigators, social workers, interpreters, and 
other necessary support services; lack of training; and minimal contact between 
defense counsel and their clients and the clients’ families.51 
B.  Judges Take Notice 
Concern about costs is not just something that commissions worry over in 
reports, or chief justices complain about to legislators.  This concern has also 
penetrated the courthouse walls, where it has shaped the interpretation of the right 
to counsel, not just the states’ responsibility under that right.  In his concurring 
opinion in Argersinger v. Hamlin, Justice Powell worried that the Court’s decision 
                                                                                                     
 45. Leigh I. Saufley, Chief Justice, Me. Sup. Jud. Ct., The State of the Judiciary: A Report to the 
Joint Convention of the Second Regular Session of the 123rd Legislature 1 (Feb. 5, 2008), (transcript 
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 46. Id. at 6. 
 47. Id. at 6-7. 
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 49. COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FINAL REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF 
THE STATE OF NEW YORK 1 (2006), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefense-
commission/IndigentDefenseCommission_report06.pdf. 
 50. Id. at 17. 
 51. Id. 
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recognizing that the right to court-appointed counsel in all cases where the 
defendant faces the threat of incarceration imposed an unjustified financial burden 
on the state courts and their budgets: “It is doubtful that the States possess the 
necessary resources to meet this sudden expansion of the right to counsel.”52 
Justice Powell’s candid observation has both a positive and normative 
component.  The positive component—that financial concerns shape the 
interpretation of the scope of a constitutional right—is not surprising to anyone 
familiar with legal realism,53 or its progeny, Critical Legal Studies54 (in other 
words, anyone who attended law school in the past one-hundred years), with their 
emphasis on empirical evaluation of the consequences of legal decisions, as 
opposed to consideration of legal doctrine or text in exclusively formal terms.  Its 
normative dimension is more troubling.  One could retreat to a formal reading of 
the Sixth Amendment, and question why Justice Powell found the need to interpret 
the phrase “to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense” to include the 
condition: “if it is not too much of a burden on the budget,”55 or to limit the scope 
of the right to counsel only to cases where life or liberty is in jeopardy.  After all, 
the framers of the Bill of Rights were capable of including the phrase “deprived of 
life, liberty, or property” in the Fifth Amendment, and there is no formal reason to 
believe that this limitation on the scope of the right to counsel would be implied in 
the Sixth Amendment simply because it was explicit in the Fifth Amendment; in 
fact, the opposite conclusion seems more likely.   
But, instead of formalism, a more fruitful critique proceeds from the 
recognition that while government expenditures are always a scarce resource, there 
are always funds available for some programs and not for others.  Starving the 
courts of resources by further limiting, for example, the classes of defendants for 
whom government-funded defense is available, does not make them more attractive 
to funders.   
Though there are problems with felony representation,56 the real problem is in 
                                                                                                     
 52. 407 U.S. 25, 55 (1972) (Powell, J. concurring). 
 53. “Legal realism understands the law as indeterminate, necessitating judges to look to extralegal 
considerations.”  Megan Gaffney, Note, Boumediene v. Bush: Legal Realism and the War on Terror, 44 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 197 (2009) (citing Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of 
Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 1922 (2005)). 
 54. “The basic ambition, to facilitate the reali[z]ation of a more ‘reflective’ politics, remained, but 
Unger’s critique was now directed more immediately against the formalist pretensions of positivist 
theories of law. . . .  [I]t emphasi[zed] the empirical in order to reveal the politics of law.” IAN WARD, 
INTRODUCTION TO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY 60 (2d ed. 2004). 
 55. This is precisely the complaint that Justice Brennan levels in his dissent in Scott v. Illinois, 440 
U.S. 367, 384 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting), which held that the right to counsel does not extend to a 
person accused of an offense that carries the potential punishment of incarceration, but only to 
defendants against whom a punishment of incarceration will actually be sought: “In my view, the plain 
wording of the Sixth Amendment and the Court’s precedents compel the conclusion that Scott's 
uncounseled conviction violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and should be reversed.”  Id. at 
376. 
 56. In our nation’s seventy-five largest counties in May 2004 alone, there were 57,497 felony 
charges filed, and in 95 percent of the cases in which a conviction was obtained, it came as a result of a 
guilty plea.  TRACEY KYCKELHAHN & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY 
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES 1 (2008), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content 
/pub/pdf/fdluc04.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).  
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misdemeanor representation in state court. Most individuals charged with felonies 
do have counsel,57 though there are still too many that do not.  At the misdemeanor 
level, conversely, the discrepancy is particularly stark.  Approximately one-third of 
individuals charged with a misdemeanor in federal court represent themselves 
during the proceedings.58  Federal courts are able to draw on the federal public 
defender program, as well as attorneys appointed under the Criminal Justice Act,59 
to fulfill the need for representation; so if the federal system cannot assure 
representation, it is not surprising how much more worse off a state defendant can 
be.   
State court prosecutions represent approximately 95 percent of all prosecutions 
in a given year.60  In a survey of jail inmates, 28.3 percent of individuals who had 
been charged with a misdemeanor had no counsel.61  In 2005 alone, state court 
prosecutors closed nearly 7.5 million misdemeanor cases.62  Extrapolating from 
these statistics, we can assume that almost 2.2 million defendants participated in 
the criminal justice system without the aid of counsel in one year.  Or, put another 
way, the right to counsel is not offended, in its current interpretive incarnation, by the 
practice of bringing more than two million people a year into court and imposing 
serious consequences upon them based on their unaided responses to accusations and 
questions they likely do not understand.  That, one would hope, does not sound like a 
very fair system.  And, if fairness is a quality that is valued in criminal justice 
systems, this inequity means that it is less likely that the legislators who control the 
county, state, and federal purse strings will devote additional funding to the system.  
In other words, if we recognize that it is important for legislators to have confidence 
in the fairness of the criminal justice system, we should be concerned about the 
outward manifestations of fairness.  Nobody will believe our criminal justice system 
is fair if, at a minimum, it does not even look fair.   
In order to alter the funding priorities of decision-makers, I suggest that 2.2 
million misdemeanor defendants each year should not be allowed to enter a plea or 
negotiate bail or conditions of release without the advice and assistance of counsel 
who is familiar with their cases and trained in criminal law. 
V.  CHANGING THE VALUE CALCULATION 
A.  Cross-discipline Insights 
The decision-makers who fund indigent legal services are economic actors, 
subject to the same forces (rational and otherwise) that guide the decisions of other 
economic actors.  As such, it is worth considering their decisions about the proper 
funding level for indigent legal services in the context of economic analysis, 
particularly the advances that have been made by researchers and scholars in the 
                                                                                                     
 57. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 3 
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field of “behavioral law and economics.”63 
Traditional economic analysis of law presumes that all human behavior 
involves participants who maximize utility from a stable set of preferences and 
accumulate an optimal amount of information in a variety of markets, 64 and it then 
attempts to analyze the legal implications of that presumption on markets and other 
institutions.65   
Traditional law and economics would suggest that the scope of the right to 
counsel—an entitlement—should be limited, as it constitutes a transaction cost, 
which interferes with the free ability of parties to influence the funding outcome.  If 
there is such a thing as an ideal amount of funding for indigent legal services, one 
might argue that the existence of an entitlement to this funding actually constitutes 
a barrier to reaching that equilibrium.66      
Because there is not a fixed appropriate level for funding of representation of 
criminal defendants who cannot afford counsel, which is determinable with sole 
reference to the utility of the justice system to society, those of us who care about 
the viability of our indigent defense systems need to take account of how these 
systems are perceived.  The perception of fairness, in addition to the actual fairness 
that must be a part of these systems, plays an important part in the evaluation of 
these programs by the government officials who ultimately fund them.  Value does 
not exist in a vacuum of rationality. 
Behavioral law and economics, in contrast to traditional law and economics, 
begins with the presumption that human behavior usually involves much more than 
maximizing utility for a stable set of preferences based on an optimal amount of 
information.  Instead, drawing on psychology and the social sciences, behavioral 
law and economics explores the legal implications of predictable, systematic 
departures from the rational model of human behavior, including the absence of 
                                                                                                     
 63. In 2002, Kent Greenfield noted that “if one could invest in areas of legal scholarship, 
‘behavioral law and economics’ (BLE) would be a growth stock.  During the last several years, BLE has 
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 64. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976). 
 65. Jolls et al., supra note 63, at 1476. 
 66. Ronald Coase’s The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960), is likely the most-cited 
paper in all of economics, and I see no reason to stop the trend here.  Coase argued that, in the absence 
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infinite rationality, the presence of limited willpower, and the limits of self-
interest.67 
One behavioral economics experiment demonstrates how rational choice does 
not adequately explain the way people assign value: the ultimatum game.68  An 
ultimatum game involves two subjects.  One party, the proposer, is given an 
amount of money and told to offer some portion of it to the other party, the 
responder.  The proposer has three choices: offer nothing, offer a small amount, or 
offer a large amount.  The responder has only two choices: accept the offer or reject 
the offer.  If the responder accepts, the money is divided accordingly.  If the 
responder rejects, neither the responder nor the proposer get anything.  If the 
participants only acted rationally, every responder would accept any offer greater 
than zero.  The responder starts with nothing and will continue to have nothing if 
the responder rejects.  Even if the responder is only offered a small amount, she 
should prefer something to nothing.   
But, that is not what happens.  As a general matter, these experiments show 
that responders typically reject offers of less than 20 percent of the amount 
proposed, and the average amount that responders say they will accept is between 
twenty and thirty percent.69  Decision-makers often prefer no deal to an unfair deal. 
B.  Application to the Right to Counsel Crisis 
This experiment should provide some guidance in the consideration of the 
right to counsel.  Leave aside whether Justice Powell is correct as a normative 
matter—as a purely positive observation, he is undoubtedly correct that concern 
over resources does shape the interpretation of the proper scope of the right to 
counsel.  If the right to defense counsel is important, and all other things being 
equal, more government funding would improve the ability of courts to meet the 
obligation to provide counsel, then the proper response from courts should be to 
require counsel in more cases.  If courts actually treat defense counsel as 
necessary—that is, if they refuse to proceed with a case unless defense counsel is 
present and prepared—then it follows that it is more likely that defense counsel 
will appear necessary to outsiders, such as the legislators who pay the bills.  And, if 
courts will not punish individuals who do not have appropriate assistance, then 
courts will seem more fair.  “The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant 
admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not 
still be done.”70  The crisis in funding of indigent defense systems could be seen as 
further evidence that sometimes legislators prefer no deal to an unfair deal.  By 
embracing the changes I am suggesting, criminal defense systems could become 
more of a fair deal. 
While I focused on the problem of representation in criminal matters as if it 
exists in a vacuum, I do want to briefly acknowledge that a potential solution to this 
problem can at the same time exacerbate a related crisis: the right to a speedy 
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trial.71  Thirty-five years ago, one scholar observed that the right to a speedy trial 
had reached the point where it was “more honored in the breach,” and that 
institutional arrangements had converted “the right of every criminal defendant to 
have a speedy trial into a very different sort of right: the right of a few defendants, 
most egregiously denied a speedy trial, to have the criminal charges against them 
dismissed on that account.”72  The situation has not improved with age.  My 
proposal to require courts to be more expansive in their recognition of the 
importance of the assistance of counsel can only make things worse if courts are 
already having difficulty resolving criminal charges.  But as a more fundamental 
matter, as we think about the design and operation of the criminal justice system, it 
does not seem fair to require those accused of crimes yet still entitled to a 
presumption of innocence to bear the weight of the consequences of design flaws 
or funding meanness.  Problems must be honestly confronted, whether in the 
provision of counsel, the training and supervision of counsel, or the speedy 
processing of claims.  For too long, the constitutional doctrine has been forced to 
adapt to the funding, and that formula ought to be reversed.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The right to publicly funded counsel ought to apply to all cases where an 
individual is charged by the government with committing a crime, whether or not 
that crime carries the penalty of incarceration.  And, the right to publicly funded 
counsel ought to be expanded beyond the current guidelines, which dictate public 
funding only for those defendants below the federal poverty line, and beyond those 
defendants who would otherwise be unable to provide their dependents with the 
necessities of life.73 
This is the part of the Article when the author typically points out that there 
needs to be a lot more study on a particular question before a solution can be found, 
and then quits, quite pleased with the result.  Instead of that, I urge consideration of 
tough medicine, with which, unfortunately, there is no sugar. 
Courts must rethink the rules for waiver of the right to counsel74 and the 
procedures for receiving such waivers. In the short-term, this will be expensive.  
Courts need to rethink the rules for waiver, as a fundamental matter, because they 
are in conflict with the purpose of the Sixth Amendment and they lead to the 
breakdown of the adversarial criminal process. 
But as a practical, and political matter, courts need to rethink the process—the 
videos, the speeches, the lawyer-of-the-day—because they are an inadequate 
substitute for assistance of counsel that, nonetheless, becomes lodged in the 
                                                                                                     
 71. For the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section’s standards and guidelines on the 
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public’s mind as a perfectly appropriate substitute.  No government official will 
support spending millions of dollars for an adequate indigent defense system when 
he or she believes that a fifteen-minute video does the job just as well. 
As a result of this, though, more defendants will request lawyers.  
Arraignments will take longer, as will bail hearings, plea negotiations, motions to 
suppress and appeals.  Most courts in this country are experiencing some level of 
backlog and that will grow significantly.  Courts will need more money to pay for 
staff and judge time for the increase in trials.  And, the indigent defense systems 
will initially be put under enormous strain, because political priorities will lag 
behind reality with regard to funding. 
If society treats defense counsel for the indigent as a luxury at best and an 
inconvenience more often, the incentive for government officials to fully fund, 
staff, and supervise the provision of such services drops to zero.  No amount of 
pretty words in the Constitution or in decisions by the courts is capable of altering 
that basic equation.  There is no shortage of lawyers, no shortage of intelligence, no 
shortage of office space, or of paper, or of ink.  The only scarcity infecting our 
indigent defense system is a shortage of money.  That money is being spent on 
things that legislators value. 
What would we get in return?  The guarantee of a right to counsel.  More 
broadly, we can reaffirm the idea that we do not repeal our fundamental protections 
by neglect.  We have a Constitution, and a process for repeal of provisions we find 
unnecessary or outdated or too expensive (for example, Prohibition).  When any 
part of the Constitution can become inoperative as a function of looking the other 
way, how can we depend on any of its protections? 
Defense counsel in Massachusetts and elsewhere have already taken it upon 
themselves to refuse to accept appointments until systems for reimbursement and 
caseload management are improved.75  One scholar has argued persuasively that 
lawyers have an ethical obligation to refuse new cases, and to withdraw from 
existing cases, when excessive caseload diminish the attorney’s ability to provide 
representation of an appropriate quality to clients.76  These are admirable steps, but 
they are not likely enough. 
In addition, prosecutors and judges should begin to refuse to process cases when 
actual counsel has not been provided to the defendant and given adequate time and 
resources to research and strategize about the case, whether or not the defendant faces 
the threat of actual incarceration, and whether or not the defendant makes more than a 
subsistence income.  All lawyers, including prosecutors and judges, take an oath to 
uphold the Constitution. Continual participation in a criminal justice system in which 
the accused does not enjoy the assistance of counsel is a violation of this oath.  This 
civil disobedience—or, rather, civil obedience to the letter and spirit of the Sixth 
Amendment—will restore some measure of fairness to the adversarial criminal 
process.  Appropriate funding will follow. 
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